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Abstract
Intermittent renewable energy sources, including solar and wind power, typically remain
more expensive than conventional power sources. As a consequence, few intermittent power
projects would have been deployed if specific policy instruments had not been implemented.
Existing policy instruments facilitating the deployment of intermittent renewable energy
technologies include the feed-in tariff, the feed-in premium and the quota system. Based on
a numerical analysis, it is shown that these specific policy instruments do not necessarily
facilitate the deployment of valuable energy sources because they ignore the cost of inter-
mittency. A valuable intermittent energy source is defined here as a source of energy which
requires little financial support and which limits the need for capacity payments in order to
ensure the security of supply. Based on insights from the numerical analysis, a new policy
instrument is suggested: a multiplicative premium. This type of policy instrument would
increase the likelihood that valuable intermittent energy assets are deployed in priority.
Keywords: Intermittent renewables, value of energy, security of supply
1. Introduction
Intermittent renewable energy generating technologies (e.g.: wind and solar power) have a
low carbon footprint and thus can be part of a larger solution to mitigate the anthropogenic
impact on climate. In addition, such technologies can contribute to increased energy security
if their deployment reduces the need for fossil fuel imports (Narbel, 2013), they can reduce
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local air pollution (van Kooten, 2010) and they have the potential to address concerns on
the projected depletion of fossil fuels (Dinica, 2006).
Despite a recent fall in the cost of wind and particularly of solar power, intermittent renew-
able energy technologies are not competitive at current market prices (Gawel and Purkus,
2013) and few intermittent power projects would be realized without some type of support.
As a consequence, specific policy instruments to stimulate investment in intermittent renew-
able energy technologies (Gowrisankaran et al., 2011) have been put in place by countries
seeking the benefits of these technologies.
The use of specific policy instruments directed towards renewable energy was found to be
justified when a direct intervention such as a carbon tax, a first-best solution, may not suffice
to stimulate enough deployment to generate learning which will lead to cost reductions
(Menanteau et al., 2003; Palmer and Butraw, 2005), when a carbon tax cannot correct all
externalities in the energy sector or when implementing a carbon tax is politically difficult
(Kalkhul et al., 2013). Hence, a specific policy instrument is a feasible temporary pragmatic
alternative to a first-best optimum (Kalkhul et al., 2013).
Existing policy instruments can be distinguished between price-based (e.g.: feed-in tariffs,
feed-in premiums and bidding processes) and quantity-based instruments (e.g.: quota sys-
tems) (Menanteau et al., 2003). An issue associated to such policy instruments is that they
are more complex to administer than a carbon tax (Green and Yatchew, 2012). As such, a
significant amount of ’guessing’ (Hirth et al., 2013) is required from policy makers on the
short and long-term costs and benefits of these technologies in order to make the policy
instrument effective and efficient.
Many studies have concluded that feed-in tariffs have proven to be the most effective amongst
the common policy instruments (Couture and Gagnon, 2010; Finon et al., 2002; Green and
Yatchew, 2012; Menanteau et al., 2003), because they provide the plant owner with long-term
financial stability (Lesser and Su, 2008). Effective policy instruments are those resulting in
the rapid deployment of renewable energy supply. Nevertheless, a rapid development may
not be efficient, especially if the policy instrument does not incentivize investors to build
energy sources which deliver when energy is the most valuable (Green and Yatchew, 2012).
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Both effectiveness and efficiency of a policy instrument are traditionally measured in terms
of the direct cost of energy and some researchers (Green and Yatchew, 2012; Gowrisankaran
et al., 2011; Jaegemann, 2014) are now suggesting a move towards instruments based on
the realized value of energy instead. Two criteria shall be used in this study to define a
valuable intermittent energy source: An intermittent source of energy is deemed valuable if
it generates power during high-prices hours and if it limits the need for capacity payments
implemented to guarantee the security of supply. The first criterion pertains to the direct
cost of generating electricity, whereas the second criterion reflects the cost of intermittency.
The emphasis is then put on how specific policy instruments perform at delivering valuable
intermittent energy to the power system.
Based on a numerical analysis using historical day-ahead data for West Denmark, a general
point made is that existing policy instruments do not necessarily reflect the value of energy
and that there is consequently a need for a new system which will minimize the total cost
of generation (Lamont, 2008). A uniform multiplicative premium is proposed, which would
reward power station owners whose power production matches the market needs. Simple to
administrate, such policy instrument would be more likely to facilitate the deployment of
valuable intermittent renewable energy projects as the Danish example will illustrate.
The rest of the paper starts by theoretically defining a valuable intermittent source of en-
ergy in Section 2. Section 3 consists of a numerical analysis to determine how effective
existing policy instruments are at facilitating the deployment of valuable intermittent re-
newable energy. An alternative policy instrument is proposed in Section 4. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2. Definition of a valuable intermittent energy source
A number of authors have tried to define what a valuable intermittent energy project is.
For instance, Gowrisankaran et al. (2011) define a valuable intermittent energy source as a
source of energy which production of electricity correlates with the load. Hirth (2013) sees
the market value of an intermittent energy source as the revenues a generator can earn on
the market in the absence of subsidies. In a more advanced version, Lamont (2008) think of
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the long-term marginal value of an intermittent power station as a function of the station’s
capacity factor and of the covariance between the production of electricity and the system
marginal cost. The most valuable power projects are those which allow for a reduction of the
capacity of dispatchable power plants while maintaining the same level of system reliability.
The definition of a valuable intermittent renewable energy project used here is closest to
Lamont (2008) and is based on two metrics: the spot price and the cost of intermittency.
2.1. Spot Price
Each intermittent renewable power station has a unique electricity production pattern, which
depends on the technology and the location. For example, some wind farms located along
a coastline generate most of their power in the morning and late in the afternoon when
thermal inversion between land and sea occurs. The production of electricity of a solar
photovoltaic (PV) power station is directly linked to incoming solar radiations. A PV power
station will consequently produce more electricity during day-time than at night and more
electricity over summer than over winter. If the general production pattern of an intermittent
power station is known, the exact production pattern is stochastic, for example by cause
of changing wind, cloud coverage and temperature. These production patterns will match
differently the market needs (i.e. the spot price), hence making some renewable power
stations more valuable than others.
The evolution of a spot price over 24 hours and the electricity production profiles of two
intermittent renewable technologies are illustrated in Fig. 1.
The electricity production profile of the second intermittent technology (right graph) better
matches the needs of this particular market because more power is generated during high
prices hours compared to the first technology. Hence, the electricity produced by the second
technology is more valuable.
In the absence of policy instrument and costs being equal between technologies, the ex-
pectation on future spot prices would be sufficient to lead to the construction of the most
valuable power projects. However, the lack of competitiveness of the intermittent technolo-
gies in the current electricity market has forced policy makers to implement some type of
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Figure 1: Spot price (measured on the left axis) and production of electricity from two intermittent renewable
energy technologies (measured on the right axis).
policy instrument in order to facilitate their deployment. These policy instruments will pro-
vide incentives to investors, who estimate the profitability of an investment based on various
approaches, including the net present value (NPV) approach. A version of the NPV formula
valid for an intermittent renewable energy project is:
V = −I +
Y∑
y=0
∑H
h=0 qh(e(µ, σ)) · ph(Th, Dh, Sh)− Cy
(1 + r)y
(1)
where I stands for the initial investment, y is the year of the cash flow and Y is the duration
of the project. The discount rate r is the factor adjusting future cash flows for risk and
the time value of money. The quantity of electricity q produced in hour h depends on an
exogenous factor e such as wind speed or incoming solar radiation, which is stochastic with
a mean µ and a variance σ. The price ph depends on the tariff Th implemented to support
the deployment of intermittent renewable energy, on the demand function for power Dh and
the supply function of power from other sources Sh. Finally, Cy accounts for the operational
costs.
Since the price perceived by the plant owner depends at least partly on the policy instrument
in place, the design of such policy instrument is important. For instance, the revenues of
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power projects built under a feed-in tariff1 come solely from the policy instrument rather
than being market-based. The numerical analysis will show that a feed-in tariff does not
incentivize investors to primarily deliver power projects which generate energy when market
prices are high. As a consequence, the energy delivered may be of limited value to the
system.
2.2. Cost of intermittency
The second metric defining a valuable intermittent energy project pertains to the cost of
intermittency. The security of supply requires that consumers can obtain electricity when
they need it. Given the inherent characteristics of intermittent renewable energy, the security
of supply cannot be guaranteed by solely relying on intermittent renewable energy (van
Kooten, 2010; Oswald et al., 2008). Therefore, dispatchable capacity is needed to compensate
for the intermittency of some technologies and balance demand and supply of electricity at
all times. While the dispatchable capacity is still needed in the presence of intermittent
renewable energy, the economics of the extant generation mix is likely to be negatively
impacted (Jacobsen and Zvingilaite, 2010).
In a functioning electricity market such as the Nord Pool power market, a power plant owner
will decide how much energy he can deliver in a given hour and for what price; normally the
marginal cost of producing power. Such action is known as placing a bid and if accepted,
the plant owner will receive the market price per MWh supplied.
The levelized cost of energy of a power plant can be calculated using:
LCOE =
Cc ·R
f ·H + l ·
Cfixedo
f ·H + l · C
variable
o + l ·
Cf
f ·H︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal cost
(2)
where Cc is the capital cost, Co is the series of annualized fixed and variable operation and
maintenance (O&M) costs, Cf is the series of annualized fuel costs, H is the number of hours
in a year, R is the capital recovery factor, f is the capacity factor and l is a levelization
factor.
1A feed-in tariff is a policy instrument which guarantees a fixed price for every unit of electricity sold.
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The marginal cost of producing energy for a thermal power plant is equal to the sum of the
variable and fuel costs incurred to generate electricity. The difference between the marginal
cost and the spot price then serves to cover the fixed variable costs and capital costs, and
to generate a profit. As long as the average market price per unit of electricity sold exceeds
the levelized cost of the plant, the plant owner will realize a positive return over investment.
Everything else being equal, the deployment of intermittent renewable energy will pressure
the economic viability of the extant dispatchable capacity. This is because the deployment of
zero marginal cost energy will force dispatchable power plants to curtail their production of
electricity2. Such reduction in electricity production will force existing power plants to spread
their fixed costs over fewer units of energy (in Eq. (2), f diminishes), hence augmenting
their levelized costs. Past a threshold, this situation may lead to the retirement of a number
of dispatchable power plants. Assuming that some of these plants are critical to ensure that
sufficient capacity is available in times of high residual loads, retiring dispatchable capacity
will threaten the security of supply. In such situation, policy makers may be forced to
introduce some sort of capacity payment mechanisms3 to improve the economic viability of
dispatchable power plants and ensure that these plants remain online (MacCormack et al.,
2010). These capacity payments are thus a consequence of the intermittency issue of some
renewable energy sources (Oliveira, 2013).
The need for compensating a producer depends on the combined electricity generation profile
of all intermittent renewables. Fig. 2 depicts a load duration curve (solid black line), which
is determined by ordering the hourly supply of electricity over a period of time (e.g. each
hour of one year) from highest to lowest.
In the absence of intermittent renewable energy, the dispatchable capacity needed to ensure
the security of supply is equal to the maximum load. When intermittent renewable energy
2Intermittent power stations impose no operational costs of producing electricity, whereas most dispatch-
able power plants do, mainly because of their fuel costs. This creates a merit order between the dispatchable
and intermittent technologies (Oliveira, 2013).
3A capacity payment compensates an electricity producer for the capacity it has available and provides
a revenue stream in addition to revenues generated by the sale of electricity.
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Figure 2: Load duration curve (in black) and two example of residual load duration curves (in grey).
sources are present, conventional power plants face a new load duration curve which is net
of the energy generated by the intermittent renewables: the residual load duration curve or
net load (van Kooten, 2010). Two residual load duration curves are shown in Fig. 2. In the
first case (residual load duration curve 1), the residual load duration curve is flatter than
the original curve. This implies that some of the dispatchable capacity becomes redundant
as it is no longer needed to ensure the security of supply, hence avoiding or limiting the need
for capacity payments. This need will depend on how dispatchable power plants need to
adjust their production of electricity in response to the deployment of intermittent energy.
In the second case, the residual load duration curve is steeper than the load duration curve.
The maximum residual load faced by conventional power plants is unchanged compared to
the base case, although the total quantity of power to be generated by dispatchable power
stations is reduced. Capacity payments may be required to ensure that enough dispatchable
capacity remains online in the future.
Combining the cost created by the intermittent characteristic of some renewable energy
forms to the ability to deliver power during high prices hours, a valuable intermittent power
station is thus a power station which produces electricity during high prices hours and which
limits the need for mechanisms to guarantee the security of supply.
The deployment of intermittent renewable energy also creates additional costs (Hiroux and
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Saguan, 2010). For example, the cost of balancing the system in the short-term is likely to
increase when intermittent renewables are deployed as a result of more frequent ramping-
up and down of base-load power plants (Lund, 2005). These costs have been found to
be minimal when compared to the economic impact of reducing the quantity of electricity
produced by conventional power plants (Hirth et al., 2013; Lamont, 2008) and are therefore
not taken into account here.
3. Numerical analysis
The effectiveness of specific policy instruments at facilitating the deployment of valuable
intermittent renewables is measured in the following numerical analysis. Common policy
instruments include the feed-in tariff, the feed-in premium and the quota system.
3.1. Setting of the numerical analysis
The setting of the numerical analysis is deterministic. Data on power prices, gross electricity
consumption and wind generation has been collected for West Denmark for 2011 and 2012
from Energinet (2013).
West Denmark is an interesting case because its geographical area is limited in size and wind
power already contributes significantly to the supply of electricity4. In fact, West Denmark
has deployed wind power to such an extent that the production of electricity from the extant
wind turbines sometime exceeds the local demand for electricity and this excess electricity
needs to be exported. In addition, Denmark is mostly thermal based and does not have
large-scale storage systems that can be used to mitigate the intermittency issue of its wind
turbines (van Kooten, 2010). Therefore, the ability of the country to integrate wind power
to a large-scale is weak (Lund, 2005), albeit flexibility can be achieved by tapping into the
nearby Nordic hydro-power dominated system (Jacobsen and Zvingilaite, 2010).
Denmark has adopted ambitious renewable electricity targets for the future. With a limited
potential for hydro and increased biomass use (Lund, 2007), wind and solar power are the
most mature technologies available to increase the country’s share of renewable electricity.
437% of the electricity produced in West Denmark came from wind in 2012 (Energinet, 2013).
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Thermal plant
Capacity (MW) 3,592.50
Electricity production (TWh) 26
Capacity factor (%) 41
Average sale price (Euro/MWh) 48
Capital costs (Euro/MW) 223,000
Operational costs (Euro/MWh) 17
Table 1: Characteristics of the thermal power plant used in the numerical analysis. All numbers are caculated
for the 2011-2012 period.
For the numerical analysis the gross electricity consumption in 2011 and 2012 is assumed to
be supplied by two power plants: a thermal power plant and a wind farm. The economic
characteristics of the thermal power plant are given in Table 1.
The capacity of the thermal power plant corresponds to the largest residual load during the
period considered. The production of electricity is calculated as the difference between the
demand for electricity and the supply of electricity from all wind farms. In the setting of
this numerical analysis, the thermal power plant only produces power if there is a need for
it and power prices are at least equal to the operational costs5. The average sale price is
obtained by comparing the production of electricity from the power plant to the spot price in
the hours when electricity is produced. Assuming operational costs based on Lazard (2013),
the capital costs can be estimated with:
5About 1% of all electricity consumed in West Denmark is not supplied by the wind farm and is produced
at a price lower than the operational costs of the thermal power plant. In the model, this electricity is not
produced by either the existing wind farm or the thermal power plant and shocks on production will not
show in the results of the numerical analysis.
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Solar Wind
Levelized costs (Euro/MWh) 69 60
Installed capacity (MW) 1.8 1
Power production 2011-2012 (MWh) 4,807 4,807
Capacity factor (%) 27.3 14.9
Table 2: Characteristics of the solar power station and of the wind farm used in the numerical analysis. The
levelized cost data is based on Lazard (2013).
Capital costs/MW =
(Av. sale price - Operational cost) · Power production
Capacity
(3)
The capital costs are considered to be fixed per MW of installed capacity.
Two projects are available for West Denmark to increase its share of electricity from new
renewables: a wind farm located in Esbjerg and a solar power station located in Sønderborg.
The approaches implemented to estimate the electricity production profiles of these power
stations are described in the appendix, and both production profiles over a week in April
2012 are illustrated in Fig. 3. The comments and analysis provided thereafter only pertain
to these specific wind and solar patterns and should not be taken as valid for all future wind
and solar power stations in Denmark.
The key characteristics of these power stations are summarized in Table 2.
The capacity of both power stations is adjusted such that they produce the same amount
of energy over the time period considered. The levelized costs of both plants are estimated
based on Lazard (2013) and on a direct cost basis, the cost of solar power exceeds this of wind
power by nearly 30%. Such comparison however ignores the value of energy (Jaegemann,
2014).
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Figure 3: Illustration of the estimated production profiles of both power stations during the last seven days
of April 2012.
3.2. No policy instrument
In the absence of policy instrument, an intermittent power station’s revenues are solely
generated via the sale of electricity on the wholesale market. By scaling up the capacity
of a single intermittent power station, hence assuming that all intermittent power stations
have the same production pattern, earlier research (Lamont, 2008; Hirth et al., 2013) has
shown that the marginal value of an intermittent power source declines as the intermittent
technology penetrates the market. The reason for this decline is that the production of
electricity from an intermittent power station displaces more expensive power from the
system, in effect driving down the system price. This conclusion is important in the case of
West Denmark; a geographically limited area in size with concentrated wind resources and
high wind power penetration rates.
There is a negative correlation between market prices and production of electricity from
the existing wind farms in West Denmark (estimated correlation of -0.25). The electricity
production of the hypothetical wind farm is higly correlated with the extant intermittent
electricity production (estimated correlation of 0.84), whereas the production of the solar
power station is not (estimated correlation of -0.09). This difference in correlation implies
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that the solar power station should produce during hours with comparatively higher prices
compared to the new wind farm. Confronting the estimated production pattern to the power
prices shows that this is effectively the case. Further assuming that deploying these power
stations would not affect the market prices, the solar power station would perceive a price
of 47 Euro/MWh for the electricity it sells on average, which is to be compared with the
average price of 39 Euro/MWh for the wind farm. The two power stations only produce
electricity if power prices exceed the marginal cost of producing electricity6, reason why the
wind farm does not produce to its full potential (see Table 3).
The impact of building these power stations on the spot price is ignored for simplicity
purposes7. At least in the short term, this simplification is likely to result in an overestimate
of the spot prices obtained per MWh produced. However, this bias increases with the size
of the power station; hence as long as the power stations are limited in size, the bias should
remain small.
This average spot price can be used to calculate the net present value of investing in these
power stations8. The net present value of investing in either power station is negative in
the absence of some type of subsidy and these power stations are therefore unattractive
financially.
Were these power stations nonetheless deployed, they would impact the economics of the
thermal power plant. The indirect cost of deploying an intermittent power station is two
folds. First, generating power during high residual load hours allows for a reduction of the
dispatchable capacity needed to balance supply and demand of electricity, which contributes
6The marginal cost of producing electricity is set to zero for the wind and solar power station.
7Other papers investigate the impact of deploying intermittent power stations on the short and long
term market prices. For example, MacCormack et al. (2010) and Hirth (2013) argue that electricity prices
will be reduced as penetration levels of intermittent energy sources increases. Oliveira (2013) conclude that
intermittency reduces the level of investment in capacity which leads to higher average electricity costs in
the long term.
8For simplicity purposes, the plant lives of these assets are assumed to be two years and the investment
costs are set equal to the quantity of electricity produced times the asset’s levelized costs of energy. A
discount rate of 5% is utilized.
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Solar ∆ThermalSolar Wind ∆ThermalWind
Av. market price (Euro/MWh) 47 39
Electricity prod. (MWh) 4,807 -4,621 4,773 -4,096
Net present value (Euro) -101,930 -99,128
Thermal capacity (MW) -0.21 0
Capacity factor (%) -0.005 -0.006
Economic impact (Euro) -97,628 -103,419
Intermittency cost (Euro/MWh) 21.13 25.25
Table 3: Economic characteristics of the solar power station, the wind farm and their impact on the economics
of the thermal power plant in the absence of subsidy.
to lowering the total system cost. The solar power station produces electricity during the
hour with the highest residual load, whereas the wind farm does not. Second, feeding
intermittent electricity into the electric grid results in a reduction of the production from
the dispatchable power plant. Here, the thermal power plant would need to curtail its
production by 4,621 MWh and 4,096 MWh in the solar and wind case respectively. The
difference between the production of electricity from the intermittent power stations and the
amount of ’thermal’ electricity curtailed is generated at times of prices not exceeding the
marginal cost of producing power for the thermal plant and thus do not affect its economics.
This effective reduction in electricity production will pressure the economics of the thermal
power plant, because it will spread its fixed costs over fewer units of electricity.
The economic impact of deploying a power station on the economics of the thermal power
plant can be measured with:
Economic impact =
Revenues− Costs
Electricity curtailed
(4)
where costs are given by:
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Costs = (Capacity · Capital costs) + (Electricity production ·Operational costs) (5)
Dividing the economic impact by the quantity of electricity curtailed gives the indirect cost of
deploying the solar power station. Here, the intermittency cost of deploying an intermittent
power station amounts to 21.13 Euro/MWh of lost production9 and to 25.25 Euro/MWh in
the case of the wind farm. The following paragraphs will demonstrate that current policy
instruments typically disregard this category of cost, which can nonetheless be substantial.
The indirect cost of intermittency depends on the characteristics of the system. Results
are likely to differ, for example in a hydro-dominated system where capital intensity of the
technology is the norm (e.g.: Norway) and where the intermittency of some technologies can
more easily be compensated for (van Kooten, 2010).
Since the net present value of investing in either power station is negative in the absence of
subsidy, some type of policy instrument will be needed if West Denmark wants to increase
its share of electricity from renewable energy sources.
3.3. Feed-in tariff
A first option to facilitating the deployment of intermittent renewable energy is a feed-in
tariff (FiT). A FiT guarantees a price set in advance for each MWh fed into the grid for
a fixed period of time (Couture and Gagnon, 2010). Electric utilities have the obligation
to purchase the electricity produced (Finon et al., 2002). Often, different tariffs are set
to reflect the disparity in levelized costs of various intermittent renewable technologies.
FiTs have been very effective in countries offering generous schemes, resulting in the rapid
deployment of intermittent capacity, mostly because this type of policy instrument mitigates
price and demand risks by design (Green and Yatchew, 2012). Since prices are guaranteed,
the revenues of the plant owner are totally independent from the wholesale energy market
prices.
9This amount is required to ensure that the economics of the thermal power plant remains unchanged if
the solar power station is deployed.
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In the scope of the numerical analysis, a technology specific FiT can be put in place to make
an investment into the solar PV power station or in the wind farm financially attractive.
A plain levelized cost of energy analysis indicates that FiTs exceeding 60 Euro/MWh and
69 Euro/MWh are needed to make the net present value of investing in the wind farm,
respectively the solar power station, positive.
The net policy cost CFiT of building either project is equal to the difference between the
wholesale power price Pmarketh in an hour and the price of the FiT P
FiT , multiplied by the
quantity of power qh generated in that hour for each hour of 2011 and 2012:
CFiT =
∑
h
(P FiT − Pmarketh ) · qh (6)
The net policy cost per MWh, calculated as the net policy cost divided by the quantity of
energy generated, amounts to 21.58 Euro/MWh of wind power and to 21.89 Euro/MWh of
solar power (see Table 4). This seemingly limited difference in policy costs between the wind
and solar case results from the ability of the solar power station to produce electricity in
higher priced hours. Despite this advantage, solar power nonetheless remains costlier than
wind power on a direct cost basis.
In addition, both plants will create an indirect cost related to their intermittency. This cost
is unchanged as compared to the no policy case10. The full cost of forcing one of the projects
into the grid can be calculated as:
Full cost =
Policy cost + Economic impact
Electricity production
(7)
and the full cost of forcing the wind farm into the grid reaches 43.09 Euro/MWh, whereas
this cost is of 42.20 Euro/MWh for the solar power station. In words, the electricity from this
10This result is a likely implication of a limitation of the model used. If the power station generates elec-
tricity during hours of positive residual load and power prices do not exceed the marginal cost of producing
power for the thermal plant, some other plants will have to curtail their production. This effect will not
show in the results. See footnote 5.
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Solar ∆ThermalSolar Wind ∆ThermalWind
FiT (Euro/MWh) 69 60
Electricity prod. (MWh) 4,807 -4,621 4,807 -4,096
Policy cost (Euro) 105,243 103,751
Policy cost (Euro/MWh) 21.89 21.58
Thermal capacity (MW) -0.21 0
Capacity factor (%) -0.005 -0.006
Economic impact (Euro) -97,628 -103,419
Intermittency cost (Euro/MWh) 21.13 25.25
Total cost (Euro/MWh) 42.20 43.09
Table 4: Economic characteristics of the solar power station, the wind farm and their impact on the economics
of the thermal power plant under a FiT system.
particular solar power station is cheaper on a full cost basis than the electricity generated
by this particular wind farm. These results are summarized in Table 4.
Under a FiT, a power station owner has no incentive to react to market signals. Even if
power prices fall below zero, the production of electricity will be rewarded at a fixed price.
For this reason, the wind farm produces more under the FiT than under a no policy case.
These extra 35 MWh of wind power will need to be exported at a negative price, further
pressuring the region’s electricity export capacity and increasing the cost of deploying wind
power in West Denmark.
To be efficient, in the sense that a FiT delivers the most valuable energy first, a FiT re-
quires to administratively define what the value of energy is. This process can prove to be
challenging given the uncertainty underlying the cost of the technology, the future energy
supply and the wind and solar conditions to name a few. Hence, designing an efficient FiT
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appears to be nearly impossible. An inefficient FiT will facilitate the deployment of inter-
mittent renewable energy as long as it is generous, although a fraction of it might be of little
value to the system. Consequently, a FiT appears inappropriate to efficiently facilitate the
deployment of valuable intermittent renewable energy.
Relaxing the deterministic assumption for a more realistic and stochastic setting; the ability
of the solar power station to reduce the quantity of dispatchable capacity needed to ensure
the security of supply is no longer guaranteed. However, deploying power stations which
produce electricity during times of high prices increase the chances that the system can
reduce the quantity of dispatchable capacity to ensure the security of supply. Therefore, the
implication of the numerical analysis that intermittent power stations delivering at times of
high prices are most valuable should remain valid.
3.4. Feed-in premium
A second option to facilitating the deployment of intermittent renewable energy is the feed-
in premium (FiP). A FiP rewards each unit of electricity fed into the grid with a constant
premium on top of the wholesale electricity market price. Similar to a feed-in tariff, a FiP
can be differentiated across technology types.
Performing a similar numerical analysis as under the feed-in tariff, the solar power station
requires a FiP exceeding 21.72 Euro/MWh to incentivize an investor to finance this power
station. Similarly, at least 21.20 Euro/MWh is required in the case of the wind farm. The
difference between these numbers and those presented for the feed-in tariff case can be
explained as follow. The costliest electricity from a policy perspective in the feed-in tariff
case is the electricity generated when power prices are negative. Here, no power will be
produced when the price perceived by the plant owner (power price + premium) does not
exceed the marginal cost of producing power. This leads to a reduction in the net policy
cost of deploying intermittent renewable energy. This benefit is however partially offset by
the reduction in the quantity of electricity generated by the power station, resulting in an
increase in the power station’s LCOE and consequently of the quantity of support per MWh
needed. The impact on the thermal power plant is unchanged compared to a feed-in tariff
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Solar ∆ThermalSolar Wind ∆ThermalWind
FiP (Euro/MWh) 21.72 21.20
Electricity prod. (MWh) 4,807 -4,621 4,794 -4,096
Policy cost (Euro) 104,411 101,627
Thermal capacity (MW) -0.21 0
Capacity factor (%) -0.005 -0.006
Economic impact (Euro) -97,628 -103,419
Intermittency cost (Euro/MWh) 21.13 25.25
Total cost (Euro/MWh) 42.02 42.77
Table 5: Economic characteristics of the solar power station, the wind farm and their impact on the economics
of the thermal power plant under a FiP system.
case and the total cost of forcing the solar power station into the system thus reaches 42.02
Euro/MWh and this of the wind farm 42.77 Euro/MWh. Again, the solar power station
appears slightly more valuable on a full cost basis.
Compared to a feed-in tariff system, the FiP creates an incentive to produce electricity when
it is needed most (Hiroux and Saguan, 2010; Gawel and Purkus, 2013) because the plant
owner total remuneration will rise with increasing electricity prices. Everything else being
equal, investors will favor projects which deliver electricity when prices are high, hence facil-
itating the integration of intermittent renewable energy into the electricity system (Langniss
et al., 2009). However, this type of policy instrument does not reflect the intermittency cost
and the risk of investing under a FiP is comparatively higher (Couture and Gagnon, 2010)
since future prices are uncertain. Investors are therefore likely to require a higher premium
to compensate for this risk as compared to a feed-in tariff case.
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3.5. Quota system
A third option is a quota system (QS). A QS is a quantity-based policy instrument where the
policy maker sets how much renewable energy needs to be delivered (for instance as a share
of total energy produced) (Menanteau et al., 2003). Operators can either meet their target
by generating the power themselves or buy green certificates from specialized renewable
energy generators or other operators which have exceeded their target (Finon et al., 2002).
The price of the certificate depends on how much supply is available in the market and an
oversupply of renewable electricity will drive the certificate cost to zero, for instance if wind
power gets competitive.
Both revenue streams (wholesale market price and price of the green certificates) are uncer-
tain and the financial risk of investing in intermittent power under a QS scheme is higher
(Lesser and Su, 2008) than under the two price-based policy instruments described pre-
viously. This type of policy instrument is deemed to be more efficient than price-based
instruments, because the least costly technology will be built first (Couture and Gagnon,
2010) and more efficient producers are favored (Lesser and Su, 2008).
In a deterministic setting and if only one technology is considered, the situation under a
QS and a feed-in premium is comparable. If both technologies are considered, the cheapest
technology on a direct cost basis will be built first. However, considering the full cost of
energy, a quota system is not necessarily efficient. The numerical analysis shows that a QS
would facilitate the deployment of the wind farm when the solar power station has a higher
value.
4. Alternative system - multiplicative premium
The three policy instruments investigated above; the feed-in tariff, the feed-in premium and
the quota system are based on the direct cost of energy. Of these three, the feed-in tariff
is the least efficient at deploying intermittent renewable energy as it offers little guarantee
that the most valuable intermittent energy projects are built first. The two other policy
instruments already better align incentives and market needs. Of these, the quota system is
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the most efficient since the market decides which technology is to be built and where. Yet,
these instruments are based on the direct cost of energy and they do not take the cost of
intermittency into account.
A question here is on whether it is possible to design an incentive scheme which would
facilitate the deployment of valuable intermittent energy. Hence, the aim is not to maximize
the production of intermittent electricity, nor to smooth out the production of intermittent
power but rather to deliver the most valuable power stations for the system, consequently
minimizing the total electricity system cost. To the knowledge of the author, no method is
universally recognized on how the cost of intermittency can easily and reliably be measured
and no attempt is being made here to suggest one. Rather, a new policy instrument which
may increase the chances of deploying only valuable projects will be suggested.
Deploying intermittent energy sources producing electricity at times of high prices leads
both to higher revenues for plant owners and to higher chances that some of the dispatch-
able capacity needed to ensure the security of supply can be decommissioned. The first
implication is that the prices faced by an intermittent power station owner need to be tied
to wholesale market prices (Jaegemann, 2014; Gawel and Purkus, 2013), hence ruling out
a feed-in tariff type instrument. Ideally, an intermittent power station owner should not
have any incentive to produce electricity when market prices become negative (Hiroux and
Saguan, 2010), hence ruling out additive policy instruments11. In addition, there is a benefit
in forcing the production of electricity during high residual load12, because only the pro-
duction of intermittent power during peak load can lead to a reduction in the capacity of
dispatchable power needed to balance the market. A possible approach in achieving these
goals simultaneously is by increasing the variation in prices seen in the wholesale electricity
market. A multiplicative premium would be such an option. A multiplicative premium
11Both the feed-in premium and the quota system are additive since the plant owner receives a revenue
in addition to the market price.
12In a repeated game, producing electricity during high residual load hours would reduce this load and
depress the prices in those hours. This would change the residual load duration curve and give rise to new
high residual load periods when new intermittent power would be the most valuable and prices the highest.
21
Solar ∆ThermalSolar Wind ∆ThermalWind
Multiplicative premium 1.46 1.54
Electricity prod. (MWh) 4,807 -4,621 4,773 -4,096
Policy cost (Euro) 104,027 101,162
Policy cost (Euro/MWh) 21.64 21.19
Thermal capacity (MW) -0.21 0
Capacity factor (%) -0.005 -0.006
Economic impact (Euro) -97,628 -103,419
Intermittency cost (Euro/MWh) 21.13 25.25
Total cost (Euro/MWh) 41.95 42.86
Table 6: Economic characteristics of the solar power station, the wind farm and their impact on the economics
of the thermal power plant under a multiplicative premium.
would imply from the policy maker to set a multiplicative coefficient which would multiply
the market prices for a given year13. Generating electricity in periods of high prices would
generate significant revenues, thus forcing the plant owner to deploy intermittent assets
which produce at times of high prices and high residual load.
Applying this instrument to the numerical case shows that the solar power station becomes
attractive for a lower coefficient than the wind farm (see Table 6). The policy instrument
rewarding the production of electricity during high prices hours more than the spot price
does, the solar power station becomes financially attractive before the wind farm.
The electricity production of the wind farm is lower under the multiplicative premium than
13One could imagine mimicking the feed-in tariff by setting a multiplicative premium for a year and
all intermittent projects built during that year would perceive this premium for a fixed duration of time.
Projects built the following year would receive a lower multiplicative premium in order not to overcompensate
new entrants with lower power generation costs, and so on.
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under any other policy instruments. The reason for this difference is that the wind farm
would rather curtail its electricity production instead of producing when power prices are
negative. This incentive not to produce when prices are negative lead to a reduction of the
net policy cost. In that sense, this type of policy instrument would align incentives and
market needs, hence making the multiplicative premium efficient.
It has to be noted that the price risk for investors created by the multiplicative premium is
higher than under a feed-in premium since the range in prices faced by the investor is larger.
However, a multiplicative premium is likely to be safer than a quota system. The prices of
green certificates can drop to zero, whereas electricity prices are unlikely to be at zero or
negative for a prolonged period of time.
A disadvantage of a multiplicative premium is that it would not facilitate the deployment of
costly, non-mature technologies such as wave power, which would require additional support
to become attractive to investors. Hence, if the policy objective is to facilitate the deploy-
ment of new technologies, a feed-in tariff is perhaps more appropriate than a multiplicative
premium.
5. Conclusion
A valuable intermittent renewable energy source is a source of energy which requires little
financial support and which allows for an effective reduction of the quantity of thermal power
needed to balance supply and demand of electricity at all times.
Given the comparatively high cost of intermittent renewables, feed-in tariffs, feed-in premi-
ums and quota systems have been implemented to facilitate the deployment of intermittent
renewables. These three specific policy instruments change the prices faced by investors and
plant owners. If not designed properly, a feed-in tariff can lead to the concentration of inter-
mittent energy during periods of low residual supply and create situations where capacity
payments are needed to ensure that supply is sufficient at all times. Feed-in premiums and
quota systems are more efficient at delivering renewable energy on a direct cost basis as these
policy instruments are based partly on the spot price. Yet, these two policy instruments
ignore the intermittency cost created by the deployment of intermittent renewable energy.
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A new policy instrument, a multiplicative premium, is suggested in this study. This policy
instrument rewards power stations which produce during high prices hours, forcing the
deployment of intermittent power station which deliver energy during these hours. This
type of policy instrument may therefore be more efficient at delivering valuable projects than
existing policy instruments. A multiplicative premium would be uniform to all technologies
ensuring administrative ease and providing more security to investors than a quota system.
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Appendix - Electricity Production Pattern
Each wind turbine has a cut-in wind speed vmin under which it does not generate power.
Past this wind speed, the electricity production increases rapidly with wind speed v until the
wind turbine reaches its maximum capacity C. If the wind speed increases past a cut-out
speed vmax, the blades of the wind turbine will have to be pitched such as to prevent damage
to the structure of the wind turbine and the electricity production falls to zero. In between
the cut-in and cut-out wind speeds, the electricity production is a function of the area swept
by the wind turbine A, a scaling factor f , the density of air ρ (assumed to be constant at
1.225 kg/m3) and the wind speed v measured in meter per second (m/s). The quantity of
electricity q produced at time t by a wind turbine was best approximated in this study by
the following equation:
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qwindt =

0 if v < vmin
1
2
ρAv3f if v ≤ 11
2200 + (v − 11) · 400 if 11 < v ≤ 12
2600 + (v − 12) · 320 if 12 < v ≤ 13
2820 + (v − 13) · 160 if 13 < v ≤ 14
2980 + (v − 14) · 20 if 14 < v ≤ 15
3000 if 15 < v ≤ vmax
0 if vmax < v
(8)
The scaling factor f is used to match the estimated power curve of a wind turbine as closely
as possible to the power curve estimated by the wind turbine manufacturer. In this study,
the power curve reflects this of a Vestas V90-3.0 MW wind turbine with a cut-in wind speed
of 3.5 m/s and a cut-out wind speed of 25 m/s.
Historical hourly data on wind speed were collected from www.weatherspark.com. These
wind speeds are corrected for height difference between the anemometer height and the hub
height of the wind turbine using the approximation suggested in Oswald et al. (2008):
Height correction =
ln(hub height / grass height)
ln(anemometer height / grass height)
(9)
The electricity production of the solar power station is approximated by:
qsolart = it · A · e (10)
where i is the quantity of direct, diffuse and reflected solar radiation hitting a solar panel
in Watt per square meter (W/m2), A is the area covered by the solar field in m2 and e is
the efficiency of the solar panel. A SunPower X21-345 is used in this study, which has an
efficiency of 21.5%. Hourly historical data on solar radiation were generously provided by
www.soda− is.com and are optimised for solar panels oriented south and with a tilt of 40o.
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